

Terrorism Annex

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Co-Lead Agencies: Alstead Police Department
Alstead Fire Department

Support Agencies: Select Board
Road Agent
Emergency Management Director
Health Officer
EMS
School Superintendent/Principal

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

1. This Terrorism Annex is to ensure that the Alstead Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is adequate to respond to threats of and acts of terrorism within the Town. This document:
 - a. Defines response and recovery actions.
 - b. Generally describes operational procedures.
 - c. Defines Emergency Support Functions.
2. The Town of Alstead will use established response and recovery policies, plans and procedures/guides for both initial and continuing response and recovery actions at the local, State and Federal levels.

B. Scope

1. This document applies to all threats or acts of terrorism that require response and recovery actions under the EOP.
2. It provides coordination between response and recovery agencies and will provide the necessary resources under the EOP. In order to properly address and manage all phases of a terrorist incident, the response and recovery efforts are its two components.

C. Structure

1. The Terrorism Annex to the EOP is a compendium on the management of terrorist incidents. It focuses on the management of the event as well as linkage to the response and recovery actions to terrorist incident(s).

- a. **Response actions** includes measures to identify, acquire and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.
 - 1. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance, as required.
 - 2. Response actions are predominantly law enforcement oriented and address both initial and continuing actions associated with the terrorist event.

- b. **Recovery actions** include measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the terrorism event.
 - 1. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond both initially and on a continuing basis to the recovery requirements of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required.
 - 2. Recovery actions can and often do, operate concurrently with Response Actions. *Figure 1* illustrates the relationships between the two components and is based on a unified command or management organizational structure.




Figure 1 - The relationships between response and recovery action management

II. Terrorism Hazards

A. Hazard Analysis and Assessment

1. An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population area within the Town of Alstead involving CBRNE/WMD, Cyber- and/or Agro-terrorism, may produce major impacts that will overwhelm the capabilities of the Town and State agencies almost immediately. Major impacts involving CBRNE/WMD, Cyber- and/or Agro-terrorism may overwhelm existing Federal capabilities as well.
2. The target and intended consequences (loss of life, injury, property destruction/damage, disruption of services) will heavily influence the means (e.g. gun, fire, explosive, chemical or biological agents, etc.) chosen to carry out a terrorist act. To cause serious impact that overwhelms a local jurisdiction’s capability and requires State and Federal assistance, it is likely that the terrorist(s) will use a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).
3. A summary of Alstead’s Hazard Analysis and Assessment can be found

in the Administrative Element of the Basic Plan (Appendix D).

B. Situation

1. **Terrorism** involves the use or threatened use of criminal violence against people, institutions, livestock, food sources, or facilities to achieve a political or social objective through fear and intimidation, rather than direct confrontation. Unlike a disaster caused by nature or an accident involving hazardous materials, it requires the deliberate and premeditated action of a person or group to occur.
2. **Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)** – Weapons of mass destruction are defined as any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals; disease organisms; radiation or radioactivity; or explosion or fire. At least two important considerations distinguish these hazards from other types of terrorist tools. First, in the case of chemical, biological and radioactive agents, their presence may not be immediately obvious, making it difficult to determine when and where they have been released, who has been exposed, and what danger is present for first responders and medical technicians. Second, although there is a sizable body of research on battlefield exposures to WMD agents, there is limited scientific understanding of how these agents affect civilian populations. They are described in law as:
 - a. **Incendiary/Explosives** – The easiest to obtain and use of all weapons is still a conventional explosive device, or improvised bomb, which may be used to cause massive local destruction or to disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents. The components are readily available, as are detailed instructions on constructing such a device. Improvised explosive devices are categorized as being explosive or incendiary, employing high or low filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Projectiles and missiles, including aircraft used against high-profile targets such as buildings, monuments and special events, also can cause explosions and fires. Bombs and firebombs are cheap and easily constructed, involve low technology, and are the terrorist weapon most likely to be encountered. Large, powerful devices can be outfitted with timed or remotely triggered detonators and can be designed to be activated by light, pressure, movement, or radio transmission. The potential exists for single or multiple bombing incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Historically, less than five percent of actual or attempted bombings were preceded by a threat. Explosive materials can be employed covertly with little signature and are not readily detectable. Secondary explosive devices may also be

used as weapons against responders and the public in coincident acts. Other diversionary events or attacks could also be aimed at responders.

- b. **Combined Hazards** – WMD agents can be combined to achieve a synergistic effect – greater in total effect than the sum of their individual effects. They may be combined to achieve both immediate and delayed consequences. Mixed infections or toxic exposures may occur, thereby complicating or delaying diagnosis. Casualties of multiple agents may exist; casualties may also suffer from multiple effects, such as trauma and burns from an explosion, which exacerbate the likelihood of agent contamination. Attacks may be planned and executed so as to take advantage of the reduced effectiveness of protective measures produced by employment of an initial WMD agent. Finally, the potential exists for multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities.
- c. **Biological** – Recognition of a biological hazard can occur through several methods, including identification of a credible threat, discovery of bioterrorism evidence (devices, agent, clandestine lab), diagnosis (identification of a disease caused by an agent identified as a possible bioterrorism agent) and detection (gathering and interpretation of public health surveillance data). When people are exposed to a pathogen such as anthrax or smallpox, they may not know that they have been exposed, and those who are infected, or subsequently become infected, may not feel sick for some time. This delay between exposure and onset of illness, the incubation period, is characteristic of infectious diseases. The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on the exposure and pathogen. Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or some hazardous chemicals, the initial detection and response to a biological attack on civilians is likely to be made by direct patient care providers and the public health officials. Terrorists could also employ a biological agent that would affect agricultural commodities over a large area (e.g., wheat rust or a virus affecting livestock), potentially devastating the local or even national economy. The response to agricultural bioterrorism should also be considered during the planning process. Responders should be familiar with the characteristics of the biological agents of greatest concern for use in a bioterrorism event. Unlike victims of exposure to chemical or radiological agents, victims of biological agent attack may serve as carriers of the disease with the capability of infecting others (e.g., smallpox, plague). Some indicators of biological attack are given in *Table 1*.

Stated Threat to Release a Biological Agent
Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals
Unusual Casualties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unusual illness for region/area • Definite pattern inconsistent with natural disease
Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor, or Powder <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spraying; suspicious devices, packages, or letters

Table 1. General Indicators of Possible Biological Agent Use

d. **Chemical** – Chemical agents are intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects. A terrorist incident involving a chemical agent will demand immediate reaction from emergency responders—fire departments, police, hazardous materials (HazMat) teams, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency room staff—who will need adequate training and equipment. Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be introduced via aerosol devices (e.g., munitions, sprayers, or aerosol generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. Such an attack might involve the release of a chemical warfare agent, such as a nerve or blister agent or an industrial chemical, which may have serious consequences. Some indicators of the possible use of chemical agents are listed in *Table 2*.

1. Early in an investigation, it may not be obvious whether an infectious agent or a hazardous chemical caused an outbreak; however, most chemical attacks will be localized, and their effects will be evident within a few minutes. There are both persistent and non-persistent chemical agents. Persistent agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks. Non-persistent agents have high evaporation rates, are lighter than air, and disperse rapidly, thereby losing their ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes, although they may be more persistent in small, unventilated areas.

Stated Threat to Release a Chemical Agent
<p>Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals For example, lack of insects, dead birds</p>
<p>Complaint of Product Tempering</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unexplained/Unusual odor • Unusual taste
<p>Unexplained Casualties</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple victims • Surge of similar 911 calls • Serious illnesses • Nausea, disorientation, difficulty breathing, or convulsions • Definite casualty patterns
<p>Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor, or Powder</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Droplets, oily film • Unexplained odor • Low-lying clouds/fog unrelated to weather
<p>Suspicious Devices, Packages, or Letters</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unusual metal debris • Abandoned spray devices • Unexplained munitions

Table 2. General Indicators of Possible Chemical Agent Use

- e. **Nuclear and radiological** – The difficulty of responding to a nuclear or radiological incident is compounded by the nature of radiation itself. In an explosion, the fact that radioactive material was involved may or may not be obvious, depending upon the nature of the explosive device used. The presence of a radiation hazard is difficult to ascertain, unless the responders have the proper detection equipment and have been trained to use it properly. Although many detection devices exist, most are designed to detect specific types and levels of radiation and may not be appropriate for measuring or ruling out the presence of radiological hazards. *Table 3* lists some indicators of a radiological release.

Stated Threat to Deploy a Nuclear or Radiological Device
Presence of Nuclear or Radiological Equipment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spent fuel canisters or nuclear transport vehicles
Radiological Sickness Symptoms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Burns, nausea, hair loss
Detonation of a Nuclear Device
Nuclear Placards/Warning Materials Along with Otherwise
Unexplained Casualties

Table 3: General Indicators of Possible Nuclear Weapon/Radiological Agent Use

The scenarios constituting an intentional nuclear/radiological emergency include the following:

- 1) Use of an **improvised nuclear device (IND)** includes any explosive device designed to cause a nuclear yield. Depending on the type of trigger device used, either uranium or plutonium isotopes can fuel these devices. While “weapons-grade” material increases the efficiency of a given device, materials of less than weapons grade can still be used.
 - 2) Use of a **radiological dispersal device (RDD)** includes any explosive device utilized to spread radioactive material upon detonation. By placing radiological material in close proximity, any improvised device could be used.
 - 3) Use of a **simple RDD** that spreads radiological material without the use of an explosive. Any nuclear material (including medical isotopes or waste) can be used in this manner.
- f. **Cyber-terrorism** – Cyber-terrorism involves the malicious use of electronic information technology to commit or threaten to commit acts dangerous to human life, or against a nation’s critical infrastructures in order to intimidate or coerce a

government or civilian population to further political or social objectives (FBI NIPC, Congressional testimony, August 29, 2001). As with other critical infrastructure guidance, most cyber protection guidance focuses on security measures to protect computer systems against intrusions, denial of service attacks and other forms of attack rather than addressing issues related to contingency and consequence management planning.

Stated Threat of a Cyber-terrorism Attack
Detection of a Computer Virus by a Software Program
Unexplained Malfunctioning of a Computer Control System That Could Result in Injury or Death <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> 9-1-1 System <input type="checkbox"/> Streetlights <input type="checkbox"/> Air Traffic Control System
Collapse of Infrastructure Computer System <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electric Power Grid • Nuclear Power Plant • Water Treatment Plant
Collapse of Vital Computer Databases

Table 4: General Indicators of Possible Cyber-terrorism Attack

- g. **Agro-terrorism** – Any terrorist act using biological agents, achieved by poisoning the food or water supplies or by introducing diseases among livestock. This can involve the use of chemical or biological agents.

Stated Threat to Release a Chemical/Biological Agent into the Agriculture Industry
Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor or Powder
Unexplained Presence of Dead or Dying Animals, Birds and/or Insects
Presence of Abandoned Spray Devices

Table 5: General Indicators of Possible Cyber-terrorism Attack

3. **Other Terrorism Hazards** – Although it is not realistically possible to plan for and prevent every conceivable type of terrorist attack, it is anticipated that future terrorism attempts could range from simple, isolated attacks to complex, sophisticated, highly coordinated acts of destruction using multiple agents aimed at one or multiple targets. Therefore, the plans developed for terrorist incidents must be broad in scope yet flexible enough to deal with the unexpected. These considerations are particularly important in planning to handle the consequences of attacks using low-tech devices and delivery, assaults on public infrastructure and cyber terrorism. In these cases, the training and experience of the responders may be more important than detailed procedures.
 - a. **Low-Tech Devices and Delivery** – Planning for the possibility of terrorist attacks must consider the fact that explosives can be delivered by a variety of methods. Most explosive and incendiary devices used by terrorists would be expected to fall outside the definition of a WMD. Small explosive devices can be left in packages or bags in public areas for later detonation, or they can be attached directly to a suicide bomber for detonation at a time and place when and where the terrorist feels that maximum damage can be done. The relatively small size of these explosive devices and the absence of specific security measures in most areas make these types of terrorist attacks extremely difficult to prevent. Small explosive devices can also be brought onto planes, trains, ships, or buses, within checked bags or hand carried. Although present airline security measures minimize the possibility of explosives being brought on board airliners, planners will need to consider the level of security presently employed on ships, trains and buses within their jurisdictions. Larger quantities of explosive materials can be delivered to their intended target area by means of car or truck

bombs.

- b. **Infrastructure Attacks** – Potential attacks on elements of the nation’s infrastructure require protective considerations. Infrastructure protection will involve proactive risk management actions to prevent the destruction of or incapacitating damage to networks and systems that serve our communities.
 - i. Infrastructure protection often is more focused on security, deterrence and law enforcement than on emergency preparedness and response. The State of New Hampshire’s departments and agencies must develop contingency plans in the event critical infrastructures are brought down as the result of a terrorist incident.
 - ii. Presidential Decision Directive 63 was issued in May 1998. It established the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and outlined steps to be taken to protect critical infrastructures from disruptions that could have serious public health and safety, economic, or national security impacts.

III. Situation and Planning Assumptions

A. Situation

- 1. Until such time as an incident is determined to be an act of terrorism, response operations will be implemented under the Alstead EOP and its ESF components.
- 2. When directed, the Police and Fire Department will coordinate with the support agencies to identify potential requirements and, with the Emergency Management Director, to implement increased readiness operations.

B. Planning Assumptions

- 1. No single agency at the local, State, Federal or private level possesses the authority and the expertise to act unilaterally on many difficult issues that may arise in response to threats or acts of terrorism, particularly if CBRNE/WMD, Cyber- and/or Agro-terrorism are involved.
- 2. Local, State and Federal responders may define working perimeters that may overlap to some degree. Perimeters may be used to control access

to the area, target public information messages, assign operational sectors among responding organizations, and assess potential effects on the population and the environment. Control of these perimeters may be enforced by different authorities, which may impede the overall response if adequate coordination is not established.

3. If protective capabilities are not available, responders cannot be required to put their own lives at risk in order to enter a perimeter contaminated with CBRNE material. It is possible that the perimeter will be closed until the CBRNE agent is identified or the effects of the CBRNE material have degraded to levels that are safe for responders.
4. Although this annex takes into consideration the most probable scenarios relating to the primary categories of terrorism incidents, no assumptions should be made to the annex being all inclusive of every conceivable situation that a terrorism incident could create. Emergency responders will assess the situation and determine the best course of action based upon their training and prescribed policies, plans and procedures.

IV. Concept of Operations

A. General

1. Response and Recovery actions to terrorist events will be conducted in accordance with established policies, plans, procedures, and guides.
 - a. The Police and Fire Departments will maintain the Town's lead responsibility for response management to threats or acts of terrorism.
 - b. The Police and Fire Departments have shared responsibility for all recovery actions.
2. The Alstead EOP - Terrorism Annex provides a graduated flexible response and recovery actions to the full range of incidents.
3. An act of terrorism exceeding the local capability to resolve automatically goes to the state level for assistance.

B. Organization

1. ***Functional Organization*** – ***Figure 2, EOC Organization Chart***, details the overall response structure of the EOC involving the threat of or actual occurrence of a terrorist incident in the Town of Alstead.

Direction and control remains the responsibility of the Police and Fire Departments with implementation and coordination conducted by the EMD.




Figure 2 – EOC Organization Chart

2. ***Interagency Coordination***

Under the Basic Plan of the Alstead EOP, the EMD is responsible to ensure that emergency response tasks/activities are coordinated among all the ESFs/response agencies and across all levels of government, as appropriate.

3. ***Specialized Teams/Units***

- a. **LIST Special Operations Unit:** A regional Police unit whose skills and resources could be used to mitigate and respond to the effects of a terrorist incident in the region.
- b. **National Guard Specialty Units:** In the event federal resources were available, the National Guard has specialty units available

for terrorist events.

- c. **LIST ANY Hazardous Materials Team:** A regional hazardous material team whose skills and resources could be used to mitigate the effects of a terrorist incident in the region.

4. ***Operational Facilities/Sites***

- a. **FBI – Joint Operations Center (JOC)** – A centralized operations center established by the FBI Field Office/Resident Agent during terrorism- related incidents to provide a single point of direction, control and coordination for emergency response operations. The JOC resolves conflicts in prioritization of resource allocations involving Federal assets.

- 1) The location of the JOC will be based upon the location of the incident and current threat specific information.

- b. **Joint Information Center (JIC)** - A combined public information center that serves two or more levels of government or Federal, State and local agencies. During a terrorist incident, the FBI will establish and maintain this facility.

- c. **Alstead EOC located at the Police Station**

C. Warning

- 1. Every incident is different. There may or may not be warning of a potential WMD incident. Factors involved range from intelligence gathered from various law enforcement or intelligence agency sources to an actual notification from the terrorist organization or individual.
- 2. The warning or notification of a potential WMD terrorist incident could come from many sources; therefore, open but secure communication among local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies and emergency response officials is essential.
- 3. The Alstead Police and Fire Departments and the EMD will be notified of any suspected terrorist threats or incidents in the Town of Alstead.
- 4. The FBI will notify State and local law enforcement officials regarding potential terrorism threats.

D. Notification and Activation

- 1. Upon receiving information from the FBI of a potential terrorist threat,

the NH State Police/Office of the Attorney General, based on the advice of the FBI, will notify the Homeland Security Advisor and the appropriate State and local agencies as the situation warrants.

2. The EMD will partially/fully activate the local EOC, based upon specific threat information received. The decision to partially/fully activate the EOC will be based on the advice of the Homeland Security Advisor for New Hampshire.
3. The State EOC will be fully activated upon the receipt of information that the US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS) has raised the threat level to **RED**. The local EOC will be activated if there is specific information targeting locations in Alstead, NH.
4. In the event the threat level is raised to Orange, the State EOC would be activated upon receipt of threat-specific information (e.g., governmental facilities are being targeted).
5. Based upon the information received, the local EMD will determine the operational level of the local EOC and notify the Primary and/or Co-primary Agencies for each of the ESFs, as appropriate.
 - a. The Lead and/or Co-Lead Agencies are then responsible for notifying the respective Support Agencies, as required and outlined in the Alert and Notification SOG for the ESF.

E. Communications

1. ESF-2, Communications and Alerting is tasked with the responsibility to establish and maintain a secure communications capability for the Town, which includes voice, data, video, and fax.
2. Under the Alstead EOP ESF-2, Communications and Alerting will coordinate measures to ensure communications interoperability among the response agencies.

F. Plan Implementation

1. ***Response Actions***
 - a. Local Lead Agency assignment for Response Actions is the Police and Fire Departments for general threats or acts of terrorism within the Town of Alstead.
 - b. State Lead Agency assignment for Response Actions is the

Department of Justice (DOJ)/Office of the Attorney General (AG) /NH State Police for general threats or acts of terrorism within the State of New Hampshire.

c. Response actions specific to certain types of terrorist acts can require a shared lead responsibility with additional agencies, which have the skills and resources that can assist in defining, responding to, and managing the event. Such shared responsibilities would be:

1. Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, and food and product tampering terrorist acts the shared lead is with Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
2. Chemical, Incendiary and Explosive terrorist acts shared lead is the Department of Safety – Fire Marshal’s Office.
3. Agro-terrorist acts shared lead is the Department of Agriculture, Markets and Food.
4. Cyber-Terrorism shared lead is the Department of Administrative Services, Division of Information Management.

d. Federal Actions:

1. Upon determining that a terrorist incident is credible, the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC), through the FBI Headquarters, will initiate liaison with other Federal agencies to activate their operations centers. The responsible FEMA region(s) may activate a Regional Operations Center (ROC) and deploy a representative(s) to the affected State(s). When the responsible FEMA region(s) activates a ROC, the region(s) will notify the responsible FBI Field Office(s) to request a liaison. If the FBI activates the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters, then other Federal agencies, including FEMA, will deploy a representative(s) to the SIOC, as required. Once the FBI has determined the need to activate a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to support the incident site, Federal, State, and local agencies may be requested by FEMA to support the Consequence Management Group located at the JOC.

2. *Recovery Actions*

- a. The Alstead Police and Fire Departments shall ensure that the Alstead EOP is adequate to recover from the consequences of terrorism.
- b. The Alstead Police and Fire Departments, with the support of all agencies in the Alstead EOP, shall act in support of the response team, until such time as the Department of Justice/Attorney General/NH State Police shall transfer the Lead Agency role to NH HSEM.

G. *Incident Phases*

1. *Pre-Incident*

- a. A credible or significant threat may be presented in verbal, written, intelligence- based or other form.
- b. In response to a credible or significant threat involving CBRNE/WMD/Cyber- or Agro-terrorism, the Alstead Police and Fire Departments and the Emergency Management Director initiates a threat assessment process that involves close coordination with local, State and Federal agencies with technical expertise, in order to determine the viability of the threat from a technical, as well as tactical and behavioral standpoint.
- c. The Police Department maintains contact listing of law enforcement, State and Federal agencies and provides the initial notification to other State law enforcement authorities, State agencies as well as the FBI of a threat or occurrence of terrorism.

2. *Trans-Incident (Situations involving a transition from a threat to an act of terrorism)*

- a. The Police Department will contact local, State and Federal agencies and provide the initial notification to other law enforcement authorities, state agencies as well as the FBI of the confirmed presence of an explosive device, WMD, Cyber- or Agro-terrorism threat, capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or property loss (e.g., a significant threat).
- b. If an act of terrorism becomes imminent, and causes the

Governor to direct NH HSEM to implement the State EOP, then NH HSEM will initiate procedures to activate additional ESFs and a Disaster Field Office (DFO) if necessary). Coordination will be conducted from the designated State facility.

- c. As the situation warrants, the EMD will coordinate with the Selectmen or his/her designee regarding the need to activate the Town's Continuity of Operations (COOP) and/or Continuity of Government (COG) plans, as appropriate.

3. ***Post-Incident***

- a. An incident is defined as follows:
 - 1. The detonation of an explosive device, utilization of a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event, with or without warning that results in limited injury or death (e.g., limited consequences / State and local response and recovery).
 - 2. Or the detonation of an explosive device, utilization of a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event, with or without warning, that results in substantial injury or death (e.g., major consequences / Federal response).
- b. Once an incident has occurred, the Alstead Police and/or Fire Department will provide a Liaison to the local EOC and/or the FBI JOC, as needed.
- c. The NH State Police will contact local, State, and Federal agencies of the detonation of an explosive device, using a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event.
- d. It is feasible to have recovery operations begin while response operations are continuing. The EMD will coordinate with the appropriate local, State, and Federal agencies in determining when recovery operations will commence. Recovery operations include, but are not limited to, the following activities/functions:
 - 1. Site Decontamination
 - 2. Site Demolition or Restoration
 - 3. Memorial Services
 - 4. Victim Compensation and Disaster Assistance
 - 5. Temporary Housing Assistance
 - 6. Long-term Medical Monitoring and Surveillance

- e. The Alstead Police and/or Fire Department will coordinate with the NH State Police and FBI to determine the appropriate point at which, the scene will transition from the response and search and rescue phase to a criminal investigation phase.
- f. The Alstead Police Department, in coordination with the NH State Police will coordinate with DOJ to initiate victim assistance programs, as appropriate.

4. ***Deactivation***

- a. If an act of terrorism does not occur, the responding elements will deactivate when the Alstead Police and/or Fire Department, in consultation with the NH State Police and the Governor, issues a cancellation notification to the appropriate ESF agencies.
- b. If an act of terrorism does not occur, the responding elements will deactivate when the EMD, in consultation with the Police and/or Fire Department, issues a cancellation notification to the appropriate ESF agencies. ESF agencies will coordinate with the EOC Operations Officer and deactivate according to established SOPs/SOGs.
- c. If an act of terrorism occurs, then each ESF structure deactivates at the appropriate time according to established SOPs/SOGs. Following ESF deactivation, operations by individual State agencies may continue, in order to support the affected local governments with long-term hazard monitoring, environmental decontamination and site restoration (clean-up).

Alstead, NH	Local	Associated Local	FBI Threat	Associated Federal
Operational Levels	Description	Actions	Levels	Actions
Normal Operations Low Condition (Green).	Consist of the daily operations agencies must carry out, in absence of an emergency situation, to ensure readiness.	Preparedness, planning, training, and exercise activities are being conducted.	Level 4 – Minimal Threat	Received threat does not warrant actions beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets on higher alert status.
Operation Level 1 Guarded Condition (Blue) Elevated Condition (Yellow)	Monitoring phase triggered by the potential for an event that could threaten life, property, or the environment.	Local agencies and ESFs that would need to take action, as part of their everyday responsibilities will be notified.	Level 3 – Potential Threat	Intelligence indicates potential for terrorist incident, but not deemed credible.
Operation Level 2 High Condition (Orange)	Partial activation of the local EOC. Triggered by highly probable hazardous conditions and a strong potential for property damage or loss of life.	All ESF primary agencies are notified. The EOC is staffed with assigned personnel and the necessary ESFs.	Level 2 – Credible Threat	Confirms involvement of WMD in developing terrorist incident. State and local law enforcement notified. Federal assets pre-deployed as required.
Operation Level 3 Severe Condition (Red)	Full activation of the EOC. Triggered by extremely hazardous conditions that are imminent or occurring. Highest state of alert.	All primary and support agencies under the Alstead EOP are notified. The EOC will be on full activation with 24-hour staffing by assigned personnel and all necessary ESFs.	Level 1 – Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident	Federal resources deployed to augment State and local operations, JOC/JIC activated, EOC fully activated, State liaisons in JOC/JIC as required, Unified Command established.

Figure3 - Alignment of Operational Levels with FBI Threat Levels

V. Roles and Responsibilities

A. General

- i. Upon activation of Alstead EOP (either in whole or in part), Town departments designated as a Lead, Co-Lead and/or Support Agency for the ESFs will effectively carry out their missions and assigned roles and responsibilities, as directed/requested.
- ii. All of the ESFs will provide support within the scope of their agencies' statutory authority and assigned mission.
- iii. This section only outlines those ESFs that have roles and responsibilities specific to a response to terrorism incident. These roles and responsibilities are in addition to those outlined in the Basic Plan and ESF-specific components of the Alstead EOP.

The Police Department: is the co-primary agency to implement and coordinate the response functions. Specifically, those responsibilities are:

- a. Serves as the primary agency for criminal activity, investigations and prosecution.
- b. Works closely with NH State Police, DOJ, FBI with respect to terrorist acts.
- c. Provides liaison personnel to the local EOC at terrorist incidents.
- d. Coordinating the threat assessment.
- e. Assisting the NH State Police and FBI with crime scene management.
- f. Conduct victim interviews and collect information and/or description of perpetrator.
- g. Coordinate closely with state law enforcement authorities and other State agencies for law enforcement resolution.
- h. Establish and maintain a secure communications capability to include voice, data and fax.
- i. Provide security and integrity of the Town's Energy infrastructure.
- j. Disseminate threat information with designated ESFs and other local/state departments, as appropriate.

- k. Provide training to emergency response personnel that includes but is not limited to the following:
 - 1. Crime scene preservation.
 - 2. Evidence collection and chain of custody.
 - 3. Victim interviews.
 - 4. Combined epidemiological/criminal investigations.
- l. Coordinate with ESF-2, Communications and Alerting regarding tracing/investigating Cyber-terrorist attacks and securing affecting sites.
- m. Coordinate with ESF-6, Mass Care and Shelter to provide information about a potential perpetrator of a terrorist incident.
- n. Coordinate with ESF-8, Health and Medical Services regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations for bioterrorism, nuclear and radiological terrorism incidents.
- o. Coordinate with ESF-11, Agriculture, Natural, and Cultural Resources regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations for incidents involving Agro-Terrorism.
- p. Assume the shared role with Fire Department in the response and recovery of a biological terrorist incident, to include:
 - 1. Disease control and prevention.
 - 2. Epidemiological investigation.
 - 3. Quarantine and isolation.
 - 4. Identification of the biological agent.
 - 5. Secure laboratory services.
 - 6. Dispersal of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
 - 7. Management of immunization clinics.
- q. If State or Federal agencies are involved, then the Police Department also coordinates with them. The Police Department is responsible for the incident site and may modify its Command Post to function as a Joint Operations Center (JOC).
- r. The JOC structure includes the following standard groups:
 - 1. Command
 - 2. Operations
 - 3. Support
 - 4. Recovery

- s. Representation within the JOC may include Federal, State and local agencies with support roles. Selected Federal, State, and local agencies may be requested to serve in the JOC Command Group, the JOC Support group/Media component and the JOC Recovery Management Group (see *Figure 3*, shaded area).
- t. To maintain consistency in the management of the incident the JOC should continue to operate as structured, however, leadership of the JOC may pass to FBI dependent on the situation. Local and State Police and state agencies in support of the JOC will continue to operate, but under FBI role designation and direction.
- u. Response issues that affect multiple agency authorities and areas of expertise will be discussed by the FBI and the JOC Command Group working in consultation with local, State and Federal representatives. While the FBI on- scene commander (OSC) retains authority to make Federal response decisions at all times, operational decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent possible.
- v. The FBI OSC and the senior FEMA official will provide, or obtain resolution of conflicts in priorities for allocation of critical Federal resources between response and recovery requirements.




Figure 3 - Joint Operations Center Structure

The Fire Department: is the co-primary agency to implement and coordinate the response functions. Specifically, those responsibilities are:

- a. Establish and maintain a secure communications capability to include voice and data.
- b. Coordinate additional assistance and resources from unimpacted jurisdictions to include but not limited to the following:
 1. Detection and monitoring equipment
 2. Decontamination equipment and supplies
- c. Coordinate the provision of decontamination assistance to hospitals, first responders and when necessary, private facilities.
- d. Assist in the overall management, response and recovery of terrorist incidents involving radiological materials, to include:
 1. Detection, recovery and disposal of on-scene radioactive debris
 2. Identification of isotope(s)
 3. Plume projections
 4. Recommendations on protective actions
 5. Determination of health risk/consequences to the public and first responders.
- e. Assume the shared role with Police Department in the response and recovery of a biological terrorist incident, to include:
 1. Disease control and prevention.
 2. Epidemiological investigation.
 3. Quarantine and isolation.
 4. Identification of the biological agent.
 5. Secure laboratory services.
 6. Dispersal of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
 7. Management of immunization clinics.
- f. Assist the Medical Examiner's Office in the proper disposition of contaminated human remains, clothing and miscellaneous items, as needed.
- g. For Hazardous Materials events, establish decontamination of contaminated victims and emergency response personnel.
- h. Implement the Mass Inoculation Plan, as appropriate.
- i. Provide detection and monitoring services, equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE), as needed.

- j. Establish and maintain environmental health hazards remediation, as needed.

The Health Officer will:

- a. Assist in the efforts to ensure there is no uptake of chemical, radiological or biological agents into the food chain or the food supply.
- b. Assist the Medical Examiner's Office in the proper disposition of contaminated human remains, clothing and miscellaneous items, as needed.
- c. Implement plans and procedures to prevent, contain and/or mitigate the chemical, biological or radiological agent introduced into the agricultural and livestock environment.
- d. In the event of an Agro-Terrorism incident that involves a zoonotic disease, coordinate with ESF-8, Health and Medical Services to address the public health risks and for the dissemination of emergency public health information/personal protective actions that may be necessary.
- e. Coordinate with ESF-10, Hazardous Materials to ensure safe entry to the incident site, as necessary.
- f. Coordinate with ESF-13, Public Safety and Law Enforcement regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations, as needed.

The Emergency Management Director will:

- a. Provide information to the Selectmen for press releases
- b. Provide information to the Joint Operations Center for media and public information

The EMS will:

- a. Implement the Mass Inoculation Plan, as appropriate.

The Road Agent will:

- a. Establish and maintain the security and integrity of the Town's road and bridge infrastructure.

The Selectmen/Office Administrator will:

- a. Serve as primary public information source until event is classified as a terrorist act and media releases are assumed by Joint Operations Center (JOC) Media operations.
- b. Liaison with the JOC Media/Public Information Officer (PIO) and assist as needed/directed regarding the collection and dissemination of public information.
- c. Assist JOC in keeping media and public informed through JOC designated and approved briefings and press conferences.

Interagency Coordination

- a The EOC is the focal point for interagency and intergovernmental coordination between the following:
 - 1. FBI Joint Operations Center (JOC)
 - 2. Local Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
 - 3. Other Law Enforcement Command Posts
 - 4. Other Alstead's EOCs
 - 5. FEMA IOF/DFO

VI. Authorities & References

A. Plans

- 1. Alstead Emergency Operations Plan (2019)
- 2. Alstead Hazardous Materials Annex (To be developed in future revisions)
- 3. Homeland Security Needs Assessment for Town of Alstead (2004)

B. Standard Operating Procedures/Guides

- 1. Police Department Standard Operating Procedures
- 2. Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures